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THE CALIFORNIA PROJECT: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CON-
TINUES TREND OF PREEMPTING STATE LAW IN THE FIELD
OF NUCLEAR SAFETY IN BOEING CO. V ROBINSON
I. INTRODucTION
After witnessing the vicious power of nuclear technology at the
conclusion of World War II, the United States public clamored for
the government to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes in
order to atone for the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.' Be-
cause of public outcry, the federal legislature and judiciary adopted
a policy of promoting nuclear energy for peaceful use.2 The fed-
eral government, however, found itself dependent upon civilian
scientists to draft legislation pertaining to subjects and technologies
it did not yet understand.3 Thus, Congress partnered with the sci-
entific community to draft the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1946
and implement its vision for a new technological age.4
With subsequent amendments to the AEA, the federal govern-
ment sought to expand the role of private entities and individual
states in developing nuclear technology and regulating nuclear de-
velopment.5 As the public grew more concerned about nuclear
safety in the 1960s, however, states scrambled to regulate and con-
trol radioactive materials despite the federal government's policy of
proliferation.6 Consequently, the preemption doctrine curtailed
many state attempts to regulate nuclear energy because the federal
government still sought to promote nuclear technology.7 The pre-
emption doctrine, found in the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, declares that Congress may expressly or implic-
1. See Diane C. Maleson, The Historical Roots of the Legal System's Response to Nu-
clear Power, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 597, 597-98 (1982) (explaining rationale vision for
peaceful uses of atomic energy).
2. See id. at 598 (discussing legal system's "promotional attitude" toward
peaceful exploration of nuclear energy).
3. See id. at 601 (describing laymen government officials' necessary reliance
on scientists to understand new technologies of atomic age).
4. See id. at 600 (discussing "unprecedented cooperation" between science
and government to promote nuclear technology).
5. See id. at 601-04, 609-39 (outlining judicial mindset from inception of AEA
to more contemporary attitudes about nuclear safety).
6. See Maleson, supra note 1, at 609-10 (introducing federal preemption of
state laws attempting to regulate nuclear matters in decade of federal nuclear
promotion).
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itly preempt state law if the state law regulates in a specific field or
actually conflicts with federal legislation.8 The tension between the
state and the federal governments regarding regulation of nuclear
energy extends back to the 1950s and still persists today.9
In 2011, in Boeing Co. v. Robinson (Boeing),' 0 the United States
District Court, Central District of California, invalidated the Califor-
nia legislature's effort to stimulate radiological cleanup of the Santa
Susana Field Laboratory (SSFL), a federal nuclear research and
testing site located within the state." The court reasoned that Sen-
ate Bill 990 (SB 990) "attempts to assert state jurisdiction over the
cleanup.. . at SSFL."12 As such, the court held the AEA preempted
SB 990 for regulating nuclear technology, and SB 990 violated the
doctrine of intergovernmental immunity by regulating Boeing, a
federal contractor.13 In reaching its decision, the court examined
the AEA's text and history of decisions interpreting the AEA and
reaffirmed the federal and state governments' traditional roles in
regulating nuclear technology. 14
This Note explores the court's reasoning in Boeing and its po-
tential impact on future nuclear regulation and cleanup efforts.' 5
Part II summarizes the facts in Boeing'6 Next, Part III explores the
AEA, the preemption doctrine, and previous court decisions inter-
preting both.'7 Then, Part IV outlines the court's reasoning in Boe-
ing.8 Subsequently, Part V compares and contrasts the court's
8. See United States v. Kentucky, 252 F.3d 816, 822 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984)) (explaining ways in
which state law can be preempted).
9. For a discussion of preemption issues in nuclear technology regulation, see
infra notes 60-120 and accompanying text. See also David A. Repka & Tyson R.
Smith, A Dose of History: Nuclear Energy Cases That Shaped Environmental Law, 25 NAT-
URAL RES. & ENV'T 28, 30 (2010) (noting persistence of nuclear waste disposal issue
since inception of nuclear power industry).
10. No. CV 10-4839-JFW, 2011 WL 1748312 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2011).
11. See id. at *15 (invalidating Senate Bill 990 in entirety).
12. See id. at *5 (establishing purpose of SB 990).
13. See id. at *7-14 (discussing SB 990's invalidity under preemption doctrine
and doctrine of intergovernmental immunity).
14. See id. at *15-16 (explaining court's rationale).
15. For a critical analysis of Boeing, see infra notes 156-208 and accompanying
text; for potential impacts of the decision, see infra notes 209-226 and accompany-
ing text.
16. For a discussion of the facts of Boeing, see infra notes 21-59 and accompa-
nying text.
17. For an explanation of the AEA and preemption doctrine along with previ-
ous decisions interpreting them, see infra notes 60-120 and accompanying text.
18. For a narrative analysis of the court's reasoning in Boeing, see infra notes
121-154 and accompanying text.
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rationale in Boeing with previous court decisions on similar issues. 19
Lastly, Part VI considers the decision's future impact on nuclear site
cleanup efforts and the implications of the continuing tension be-
tween state and federal governments in nuclear energy
regulation. 20
II. FACTS
The Santa Susana Field Laboratory opened in the 1940s as a
federal nuclear research and development site.21 Chosen for its re-
moteness due to the dangerous nature of the experiments the fed-
eral government wished to conduct there, the site occupies 2,850
acres in Ventura County, California.22 After the site's inception,
the federal government contracted with Boeing to work with the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the
Department of Energy (DOE) to research, develop, and test tech-
nologies for nuclear energy generation, space exploration, and na-
tional defense. 23 These efforts continued for nearly sixty years. 2 4
Federal agencies performed two major types of research at
SSFL.25 From the 1950s to the 1980s, the DOE commissioned re-
search for peaceful uses of nuclear technology.26 For this purpose,
the DOE designated an entire section of the site to house over two
hundred buildings and sixteen nuclear reactor facilities.27 As a
consequence of the nuclear research activities performed at SSFL,
extensive radiological contamination infected the site's soil,
groundwater, and bedrock.28
19. For a critical analysis of Boeingas compared with previous decisions on the
issue of the AEA and preemption, see infra notes 156-208 and accompanying text.
20. For an examination of potential impacts of the Boeing decision, see infra
notes 209-226 and accompanying text.
21. See Boeing Co. v. Robinson, No. CV 10-4839-JFW, 2011 WL 1748312, at *1
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2011) (describing foundation of Santa Susana Field
Laboratory).
22. See id. (indicating SSFL was chosen for remote location because of danger-
ous nature of rocket engine and nuclear testing experiments).
23. See id. (listing federal government and Boeing activities at SSFL).
24. See id. (stating federal government and Boeing used SSFL for research
and testing of nuclear and rocket technologies since late 1940s).
25. See id. at *24 (discussing nuclear technology research and rocket testing
at SSFL).
26. See Boeing, 2011 WL 1748312, at *2 (accounting for large area of SSFL
reserved specifically for Boeing and DOE nuclear research).
27. See id. (describing DOE's SSFL testing facilities).
28. See id. (explaining significant contamination at SSFL caused by nuclear
fuel manufacturing, spent nuclear fuel, and core damage to one of DOE's reactors
in 1959). Specifically, the court noted that nuclear byproduct, source, and special
nuclear material infected the soil. Id. The court also determined the majority of
27920121
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The second type of research performed at SSFL involved the
testing of rocket technologies.29 From the end of World War II un-
til 2006, the United States Air Force, and subsequently NASA, used
the site for testing ballistic missile technology and liquid propellant
rocket engines.s0 As a federal contractor, Boeing also developed
and tested rocket engines and maintained six test sites on both fed-
erally-owned and Boeing's privately-owned land within SSFL.31 As a
result of these activities, NASA estimated that over 500,000 gallons
of trichloroethylene (TCE) solvent contaminated the soil, 97% of
which was released before the inclusion of a TCE contamination
prevention system in 1961.32 In addition to TCE, other volatile
chemical compounds permeated all areas of the site. 3
The California Department of Toxic Substance Control
(DTSC) determined the vast majority of the nuclear and chemical
pollution at SSFL resulted from federal activities, whereas the ac-
tions of private entities caused only a negligible amount of the pol-
lution.34 Additionally, the intrinsic link between the pollution from
private-entity activities at the site and the pollution caused by NASA
and the DOE made it impossible to distinguish private from federal
contamination.35 Consequently, California attributed the contami-
nation of SSFL almost exclusively to the DOE and NASA. 36
The SSFL site stood idle after federal agencies closed its nu-
clear testing facilities in the 1980s, during which time Boeing, the
DOE, and NASA made no decontamination efforts.37 The DOE,
the contamination at SSFL resulted from activity performed by or on behalf of
DOE. Id.
29. See id. at *3 (describing federal rocket testing activities at SSFL).
30. See id. (noting development of rocket and missile technology at SSFL
since 1947).
31. See Boeing, 2011 WL 1748312, at *3 (describing Boeing's activities and
objectives).
32. See id. (singling out TCE as example of contaminants polluting ground at
SSFL). TCE is a solvent used to clean liquid propellant rocket engines and test
stands. Id.
33. See id. (listing supplemental sources of chemical contamination). Other
chemical contaminants included: perchlorate, heavy metals, polychlorinated bi-
phenyl (PCB), dioxin, volatile organic compounds, and semi-volatile organic com-
pounds. Id.
34. See id. (explaining any private contamination at SSFL "would be de
minimis" compared to federal activity at site).
35. See id. (adding DTSC determination that any contamination resulting
from Boeing's activities would be indistinguishable and inseparable from federal
contamination because all operations occurred at same time and used same facili-
ties, chemicals, and materials).
36. See Boeing, 2011 WL 1748312, at *3 (noting impossibility of any "separate
remediation" for private activity).
37. See id. at *4 (recognizing lack of cleanup efforts by DOE).
4
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responsible for the nuclear cleanup of the site, investigated the ra-
diological contamination at SSFL for over forty years.38 The agency
finally approved cleanup procedures for the radiological contami-
nation in 1996 that would make the area suitable for suburban resi-
dential, recreational, or industrial use.3 9
The DOE did not, however, address cleanup of the chemical
contamination at SSFL, a responsibility undertaken by the DTSC. 40
While the DTSC lacked authority over the cleanup of the radiologi-
cal waste governed by the AEA, it analyzed, catalogued, and super-
vised the chemical cleanup of the site pursuant to the California
Health and Safety Code.4' This analysis proceeded over twenty-five
years.42 Finally, in 2007, the DTSC, Boeing, the DOE, and NASA
agreed on a Consent Order for Corrective Action (Consent Order)
to decontaminate SSFL.43 Nonetheless, the Consent Order was ulti-
mately ineffective because it failed to mandate cleanup of the radio-
logical contamination at the site.44
Faced with decades of federal government inaction in organiz-
ing the radiological cleanup of SSFL, the California legislature
passed SB 990 in October of 2007 to prompt cleanup efforts. 45
When the legislature passed SB 990, the area surrounding SSFL was
no longer remote; it housed more than 150,000 people within five
miles of SSFL and half a million people within ten miles of the
site. 46 In light of these population increases, the state legislature
passed SB 990 to give California the authority to mobilize the
cleanup of the radiological waste at SSFL and prescribe higher stan-
38. See id. (delineating DOE cleanup and investigation procedures).
39. See id. (describing delay of cleanup due to analyses and surveys of site
contamination).
40. See id. (identifying DTSC's supervision of chemical-contamination
cleanup at SSFL).
41. See Boeing, 2011 WL 1748312, at *4 (illustrating DTSC's authority under
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) to organize cleanup of non-ra-
diological contamination at federal facilities). The California Health and Safety
Code was modeled after the RCRA of 1976. Id. RCRA allows state laws to regulate
the cleanup of non-radiological nuclear contamination. Id.
42. See id. (listing DTSC's analyses of chemical contamination at SSFL). The
DTSC examined more than 35,000 samples of soil, groundwater, and bedrock to
analyze the contamination throughout the site and determine its sources. Id.
43. See id. at *5 (presenting Consent Order concerning chemical cleanup of
SSFL).
44. See id. (describing Consent Order as requiring parties clean up SSFL for
residential purposes). The Consent Order, however, failed to account for any ra-
diological contamination at the site. Id.
45. See id. (stating motivations for SB 990 were to mobilize radiological
cleanup of SSFL for promotion of public health and safety).
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dards for the overall decontamination of the laboratory.47 Applying
only to SSFL, SB 990 mandated a particular course of action to
make the area suitable for suburban living, recreation, and indus-
try, as well as for agricultural use.4 8 The usual procedure to deter-
mine the appropriate decontamination level for a polluted area
involves an investigation into the potential health risk for future
users and the effect on the environment from harmful exposure to
the residual contamination. 49 The California legislature's proposed
plan, however, avoided such an examination and mandated the
land should be available for subsistence farming with no analysis of
reasonable future use.50 The legislature decided the land could be
used for agriculture without consulting or receiving approval from
the DOE or the DTSC; in fact, both agencies had already concluded
citizens could not reasonably use the site for agriculture.5' The
DTSC determined it could take as long as 50,000 years to make the
site safe for farming. 52
In December 2010, the DTSC, the DOE, and NASA again at-
tempted to negotiate to compel cleanup of SSFL, which resulted in
Administrative Orders on Consent (AOCs).5 While the AOCs ad-
dressed cleaning up the soil contamination, the parties disagreed
on the cleanup of groundwater and bedrock and did not account
for certain areas of the site entirely; also, Boeing did not participate
in the negotiation of the AOCs. 5 4 Instead, Boeing filed a complaint
against the DTSC on February 28, 2011, in which it argued the AEA
preempted SB 990 under the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution.55 The official hearing took place on April 11,
2011, at which the United States District Court, Central District of
California granted Boeing's motion for summary judgment.5 6 The
47. See id. at *5 (describing SB 990 as California's attempt to assert state juris-
diction over radiological decontamination).
48. See id. (delineating strict future land-use standards of SB 990).
49. See id. (describing process for determining appropriate decontamination
standard).
50. See id. (reaffirming SB 990's standards as avoiding customary future risk
assessment of contaminated area).
51. See Boeing, 2011 WL 1748312, at *5 (commenting on conclusions by DOE
and DTSC concerning future SSFL use).
52. See id. *6 (noting DTSC's remediation analysis).
53. See id. (describing AOCs between DTSC, DOE, and NASA addressing ra-
diological and chemical cleanup of soil by DOE and NASA at site).
54. See id. (assessing AOCs shortcomings in affecting decontamination of
SSFL).
55. See id. at *1 (establishing Boeing's claim of AEA preemption of SB 990).
56. See Boeing, 2011 WL 1748312, at *16 (granting Boeing's motion for sum-
mary judgment).
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court reasoned SB 990 regulated a field federally controlled by the
AEA, and therefore the AEA superseded SB 990 under the
Supremacy Clause.5 7 Furthermore, SB 990 could not apply only to
the private contamination at SSFL because it was indistinguishable
from the federal contamination.5 8 The court also reasoned that
even if the private and federal contamination could be distin-
guished, the California legislature did not have the authority to im-
pose strict requirements on the federal cleanup effort.5 9
III. BACKGROUND
Boeing is the most recent decision in a series of cases interpret-
ing the division of authority between state and federal governments
concerning nuclear safety.60 The federal government has used the
authority granted by the AEA to regulate nuclear technology since
the AEA's inception, which has compelled courts to often review
the language and history of the AEA when deciding cases concern-
ing the issue of preemption in nuclear technology regulation. 61
Courts combine analyses of the AEA with the preemption doctrine
because these federal statutes together can invalidate any conflict-
ing state law.62
A. Evolution of the Atomic Energy Act
After the conclusion of World War II, and in the wake of the
development of nuclear energy, the federal government acted as
the sole regulator of nuclear technology and sought to encourage
its potential peaceful uses.63 With the enactment of the AEA in
1954, the federal government began to encourage private develop-
ment and research of nuclear technology for peaceful uses. 64 Ac-
cordingly, the government relaxed its exclusive jurisdiction over
57. See id. at *9 (reasoning SB 990 regulates federally occupied field).
58. See id. at *2-3 (describing "inextricably intermixed" nature of private and
federal contamination at SSFL).
59. See id. at *15-16 (noting California's lack of authority to regulate DOE
activity).
60. See generally Scott S. Smith, Federal Preemption and the AEA: How Federal Pre-
emption Law "Nukes" State Law That Affects Nuclear Waste, 9 Mo. ENVrTL. L. & POL'Y
REv. 111, 111-12 (2002) (discussing state and federal division of power in nuclear
safety regulation).
61. See id. at 111 (introducing AEA history).
62. See id. at 112 (outlining federal preemption doctrine).
63. See id. at 111 (discussing federal government's role in nuclear technology
regulation).
64. See id. (noting federal government's retreat from monopolizing use and
regulation of nuclear energy in favor of private development and state oversight).
2012] 283
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nuclear matters and allowed the states to partner with federal agen-
cies to regulate certain aspects of nuclear technology prolifera-
tion.65 The federal government tasked the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC), which later became the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), with promoting the exploration of nuclear en-
ergy and protecting the public from its dangers.66 Despite the fed-
eral government's relaxed control, the AEA still gave the AEC
exclusive authority over many serious issues surrounding nuclear
materials, including the protection of public health and safety
against the risks of nuclear technology.6 7
Under the AEA of 1954, states could regulate the economic
aspects of nuclear technology-the need for and cost of building
nuclear power plants.6 8 Yet, states lacked the authority to regulate
nuclear materials to protect against radiation hazards. 69 The fed-
eral government still perceived the regulation of actual nuclear
matters as too important to leave to the states.70 Accordingly, states
could only regulate the safety of nuclear technology with approval
from the federal government.71
In 1959, an amendment to the AEA widened the states' role in
nuclear technology regulation by allowing states to enter into agree-
ments with the NRC to receive regulatory authority over certain nu-
clear materials.72 The amended AEA, however, limited the
authority the NRC could give to the states to decisions regarding
construction and disposal of nuclear plants, and chemical cleanup
of contaminated sites.73 Congress continued to concentrate on
promoting the development of nuclear energy.74 Consequently,
65. See Smith, supra note 60, at 111 (outlining states' ability to determine
need, reliability, and cost of nuclear technology and federal government's control
over licensing "transfer, delivery, receipt, acquisition, possession, and use of nu-
clear materials").
66. See Maleson, supra note 1, at 602-03 (discussing purposes of AEC).
67. See The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-State Regulation of Nuclear Power, 97
HARv. L. REv. 238, 239 (1983) [hereinafter State Regulation of Nuclear Power] (assur-
ing exclusive authority over safety of nuclear power rested with NRC).
68. See Smith, supra note 60, at 111 (delineating state authority over econom-
ics of nuclear matters).
69. See State Regulation of Nuclear Power, supra note 67, at 239 (describing limits
of state authority over nuclear power).
70. See Smith, supra note 60, at 122 (noting federal government's belief that
nuclear safety is too important for states to regulate).
71. See id. (explaining necessity of federal government authorization for states
to regulate nuclear safety).
72. See id. at 111 (describing purpose of 1959 amendment to AEA).
73. See id. (listing limitations of state authority under AEA amendment).
74. See Maleson, supra note 1, at 609 (discussing intensification of congres-
sional focus on development of nuclear power).
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the congressional attitude stymied worries about the immense dan-
ger of nuclear technology that arose during the following decade.75
As a result, federal law preempted many state regulations during
the 1960s because states could not interfere with federal activity.7 6
B. The Preemption Doctrine
The preemption doctrine is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution.77 Specifically, Article VI, Section
Two names the Constitution as the "[S]upreme Law of the Land"
that overrides the "Laws of any State to the Contrary."78 By this
principle, federal laws constitutionally preempt conflicting state
laws in several different ways.79 First, Congress may protect a partic-
ular program from state interference with express indication in the
text of a federal statute.80 Second, Congress may preempt state law
by occupying a field with a dominant federal interest that leaves no
room for state legislation in the area.81 The federal government
uses this type of preemption most often in matters concerning nu-
clear technology and the AEA.8 2 Third, federal law preempts a
state law that either directly conflicts with a federal statute or ob-
structs the purpose or objectives of Congress. 3 For instance, if
compliance with both the state and federal regulations is impossi-
ble, or if a state law stands as an obstacle to the goals or objectives
of federal law, the federal law preempts the state regulation and
renders it void.8 4
To avoid these conflicts, many federal regulations include sav-
ings clauses, which allow states to impose more stringent, but not
less stringent, requirements than the federal law on the subject.8 5 A
75. See id. at 610 (presenting federal preemption of state regulations).
76. See Smith, supra note 60, at 112 (stating state law may be preempted by
express terms of congressional acts, congressional intent to occupy particular field,
or conflict with federal law).
77. See James B. Slaughter & James M. Auslander, Preemption Litigation Strate-
gies Under Environmental Law, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Spring 2008, at 18, 18 (dis-
cussing origins of preemption doctrine).
78. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (outlining supremacy of Constitution).
79. See Slaughter & Auslander, supra note 77, at 18 (presenting different types
of preemption).
80. See id. (defining express preemption).
81. See id. (explaining field preemption).
82. See id. at 20 (connecting field preemption with state regulation of nuclear
technology).
83. See id. at 18 (describing conflict preemption).
84. See Slaughter & Auslander, supra note 77, at 18 (noting key inquiry about
whether state laws conflict with federal law or render compliance with federal law
impossible).
85. See id. (describing possible role for state regulation).
2012] 285
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state law with a savings clause, however, still falls under the three-
pronged preemption doctrine described above.86 Thus, any state
law whose provisions conflict with federal regulation is
preempted.87
C. The Supremacy Clause and Its Limits (or Lack Thereof)
The seminal case on preemption and the AEA is Pacific Gas &
Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Com-
mission (Pacic Gas),88 which involved an attempt by the State of
California to pass a statute conditioning the construction of a nu-
clear power plant on a finding by the state energy commission that
the plant would have adequate facilities and means for storing nu-
clear waste.89 The Supreme Court of the United States decided the
statute withstood preemption by the AEA because it had an eco-
nomic, rather than a nuclear safety, purpose.90 The Court held the
AEA does not supplant the traditional roles and police powers of
the states, including the ability to make economic decisions about
the need for and cost of constructing a new power plant.91 The
Court justified its holding on the basis that the provisions of the
AEA demonstrated Congress's intent to preserve the "dual regula-
tion of nuclear-powered electricity generation."92 States may regu-
late the economic aspects of nuclear facilities, but because the
federal government completely occupied the field of nuclear safety,
any state law attempting to regulate nuclear safety would be pre-
empted.93 Pacific Gas remains a highly influential case regarding
preemption issues because it outlines the division of power between
86. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text for an outline of the differ-
ent types of preemption.
87. See Slaughter & Auslander, supra note 77, at 18 (outlining tension between
state and federal regulations that most often is source of controversy).
88. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
89. See id. at 194-95 (holding states have ability to regulate economics of nu-
clear power).
90. See id. at 216 (finding economic purpose for California statute).
91. See id. at 205 (maintaining states "retain their traditional responsibility" in
nuclear technology field).
92. Id. at 211-12 (summarizing scheme of regulation under AEA). "[T]he
federal government maintains complete control of the safety and 'nuclear' aspects
of energy generation; the states exercise their traditional authority over the need
for additional generating capacity, the type of generating facilities to be licensed,
land use, ratemaking, and the like." Id. at 212.
93. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 212-13 (explaining state nuclear safety
regulation would be preempted for regulating in federally-occupied field).
10
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the state and the federal governments in nuclear technology
regulation.94
More recently, in United States v. Kentucky (Kentucky) ,9 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit applied the
division of authority delineated in Pacific Gas to the Kentucky legis-
lature's attempt to regulate the disposal of nuclear waste.96 The
court determined federal law preempted the state statute regulat-
ing nuclear waste disposal because the AEA exclusively allocated
the matter of nuclear safety to the federal government.97 By the
same token, Kentucky could not regulate the radioactive compo-
nents of waste mixtures consisting of both radiological and non-
radiological materials.98 Significantly, Kentucky not only reiterated
Pacific Gas twenty years later but also held states could not circum-
vent federal preemption by attempting to use other sources of au-
thority, such as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), to regulate the nuclear materials covered by the AEA.9
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Mis-
souri also invalidated a state plan for decontamination of a nuclear
facility in Missoui v. Westinghouse Electric, L.L.C. (Westinghouse Elec-
tic).00 The court struck down the plan because its stated purpose
specifically involved nuclear safety. 101 The case did, however, pre-
sent an additional issue regarding preemption: whether the AEA
overrides state regulation of decommissioned facilities as well as op-
erating facilities.10 2 The district court decided that the AEA did
prevent states from regulating decommissioned facilities, further
expanding the federal government's occupation of the nuclear
94. See, e.g., Missouri v. Westinghouse Elec., L.L.C., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1076,
1083 (E.D. Mo. 2007) (showing recent application of Pacific Gas &Elecric Co.).
95. 252 F.3d 816 (6th Cir. 2001).
96. See id. at 821 (outlining state conditions imposed on DOE for waste dispo-
sal). The nuclear waste was a combination of radiological and non-radioactive haz-
ardous materials. Id.
97. See id. at 823 (noting radioactive materials are exclusively covered by
AFA).
98. See id. at 824 (identifying preemption of state law for regulating materials
covered by AEA).
99. See id. at 823-24 (rejecting ability to act in accordance with state law au-
thority when state law conflicts with federal law).
100. See Missouri v. Westinghouse Elec., L.L.C., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1085-86
(E.D. Mo. 2007) (holding consent agreement between Missouri and Westinghouse
to decontaminate nuclear facility was preempted).
101. See id. at 1088 (maintaining preemption doctrine remains applicable).
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safety field.1os According to the court, the federal government's ex-
clusive authority encompasses the safety hazards at decommis-
sioned facilities.104
D. Additional Tests for Preemption
Courts have primarily utilized the preemption analysis outlined
above when examining state laws that in some way regulate nuclear
technology. 05 Over the years, however, the federal judiciary has
employed other tests to justify or invalidate state statutes in the nu-
clear field, such as the Commerce Clause test, the "direct and sub-
stantial" test, and an examination of whether federal private
contractors are shielded from state regulation.106 First, in Washing-
ton State Building & Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO v. Spellman
(Spellman), 07 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit declared a state law regulating nuclear activity unconstitutional
for violating the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, an ap-
proach infrequently used today. 08 In Spellman, the Ninth Circuit
struck down a Washington state statute prohibiting the transporta-
tion and storage of nuclear waste produced outside of the state.109
In addition to finding the statute violated the Supremacy Clause,
the court also invalidated the law under the Commerce Clause.110
Following Spellman, Pacific Gas established preemption as the domi-
nant test for state laws attempting to regulate nuclear safety; conse-
quently, courts rarely evaluate statutes using the Commerce Clause
today."'1
103. See id. at 1087 (holding operational status of nuclear facility as inconse-
quential to preemption analysis).
104. See id. at 1086 (establishing NRC's exclusive jurisdiction over nuclear
safety at both decommissioned and operational facilities).
105. See Maleson, supra note 1, at 610 (introducing preemption analysis for
state laws regulating nuclear technology).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Manning, 527 F.3d 828, 83940 (9th Cir. 2008)
(presenting direct and substantial test); see also Washington State Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, AFL-CIO v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 630-32 (9th Cir. 1982) (ana-
lyzing state statute under Commerce Clause).
107. 684 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1982).
108. See id. at 630 (holding state law violated Commerce Clause).
109. See id. at 629 (describing nature of state statute).
110. See id. at 631 (outlining test for Commerce Clause violation). The court
invalidated the state statute for failing to regulate evenhandedly, not accomplish-
ing a legitimate local public purpose, and having more than an incidental effect
on interstate commerce. Id.
111. See generally Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (invalidating state law under preemption doctrine).
12
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Second, the Ninth Circuit used another rarely utilized test in
United States v. Manning (Manning).112 Manning involved an at-
tempt by the State of Washington to prevent additional storage of
radioactive and hazardous waste at an in-state nuclear facility until
the completion of the cleanup of the existing contamination. 113 Af-
ter finding the AEA preempted the state law, the court applied the
direct and substantial test to strike down the law.114 In addition to
the statute's purpose to regulate nuclear safety, the court deter-
mined the statute was also void because it exerted direct and sub-
stantial effects on federal nuclear safety decisions." 5 The direct
and substantial test applies most often to state laws lacking an ex-
plicit nuclear safety purpose, but which may have adverse effects on
the decisions of federal agencies responsible for regulating nuclear
safety.116
Third, the United States Supreme Court upheld an Ohio state
statute awarding additional workers' compensation benefits for in-
juries resulting from an employer's violation of safety standards at a
federally-owned, but privately-operated, nuclear facility in Goodyear
Atomic Corp. v. Miller (Goodyear Atomic Corp.)." 7 The Court con-
cluded Congress did not intend to eliminate all incidental regula-
tory effects of a state law on federal projects; in fact, the Court
found express congressional authorization in Goodyear Atomic
Corp."" The Court reasoned a private federal contractor is as
equally shielded from state regulation as the federal government
itself, unless Congress authorizes such regulation.119 In the wake of
Pacific Gas, the Supreme Court's holding in Goodyear Atomic Corp.
spread the preemption net even wider, insulating not just federal
agencies', but also agencies' private contractors.120
112. See United States v. Manning, 527 F.3d 828, 83940 (9th Cir. 2008) (utiliz-
ing direct and substantial test).
113. See id. at 831 (discussing facts of case).
114. See id. at 839 (introducing direct and substantial test).
115. See id. at 839-40 (applying direct and substantial test to invalidate state
statute).
116. See Commonwealth v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 684 F. Supp. 2d 564, 586
(M.D. Pa. 2010) (summarizing various aspects of preemption analysis).
117. 486 U.S. 174,176 (1988) (presenting issue of whether state law can regu-
late private contractor at federal nuclear facility).
118. See id. at 186 (stating congressional concern in preventing direct regula-
tion of federal activity).
119. See id. at 181 (maintaining federal facility operated by private contractor
is shielded from direct state regulation).
120. See id. at 180-81 (asserting Supremacy Clause insulates federal installa-
tions from direct state regulation).
2012] 289
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IV. NARRATIVE ANALYsIs
In Boeing, the United States District Court, Central District of
California addressed the validity of a state regulation prescribing
decontamination procedures for the SSFL facility.121 First, the
court analyzed whether the AEA of 1954 preempted SB 990 under
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. 122 Second, the court ex-
amined the Bill's legality under the intergovernmental immunity
doctrine, which is also rooted in the Supremacy Clause.123
A. SB 990's Preemption by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
In Boeing, the district court invalidated SB 990 because the AEA
of 1954 preempted the law. 124 The court utilized a test for preemp-
tion that examined whether "the matter on which the state asserts
the right to act is in any way regulated by the federal govern-
ment."1 25 Furthermore, the court maintained a state law could be
preempted in two ways.126 First, any state law regulating within a
federally-occupied field is preempted.127 Second, if Congress did
not completely occupy the field, a state law is preempted to the
extent its application conflicts with a federal law such that it is im-
possible to follow both or it stands as an obstacle to the federal law's
goals. 128
The court recognized in Boeing the regulation of atomic energy
had always been within the scope of congressional legislation, par-
ticularly since the enactment of the AEA. 129 The AEA ceded cer-
tain limited powers to the states, but only if the federal government
121. See Boeing Co. v. Robinson, No. CV 10-4839-JFW, 2011 WL 1748312, at
*15 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2011) (explaining invalidity of SB 990).
122. See id. at *9-12 (discussing federal preemption of SB 990).
123. See id. at *12-15 (presenting analysis of intergovernmental immunity
doctrine).
124. See id. at *8 (describing history of AEA).
125. Id. at *9 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.
State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 213 (1983))
(presenting test for preemption).
126. See Boeing, 2011 WL 1748312, at *9 (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984)) (introducing two general ways state law can be
preempted).
127. See id. (citing Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248) (stating congressional intent to
occupy particular field preempts any state law within same field).
128. See id. (citing Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248) (declaring state law can be pre-
empted for conflicting with federal law in two ways); see also United States v. Ken-
tucky, 252 F.3d 816, 822 (6th Cir. 2001) (illustrating test for preemption).
129. See Boeing, 2011 WL 1748312, at *9 (identifying field of nuclear safety has
traditionally been occupied wholly by federal government).
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did not already regulate the matter. 30 Under the AEA, a state law
cannot "regulate against radiation hazards" or "directly affect[ ] de-
cisions concerning radiological safety regardless of the state legisla-
ture's asserted purpose for the law." 31 Because SB 990 regulated
nuclear health and safety, the court found the AEA preempted the
state statute.132 In its analysis, the court examined the expressed
purpose and legislative history of SB 990, both of which character-
ized the law as seeking to assert California'sjurisdiction over federal
activity in the field of nuclear safety.133
Additionally, the AEA did not give California the authority to
regulate within the area of nuclear safety. 134 The court recognized
that in 1962 the AEC authorized California to "protect public
health or to minimize danger to life or property resulting from by-
product, source, or special nuclear material contamination" pursu-
ant to the 1959 amendments to the AEA. 35 Nonetheless, the court
concluded the agreement did not give California authority over fed-
eral DOE activities or the activities of the federal government's
prime contractors.136 The AEC did not have the power to delegate
authority to California over DOE activity, which remained under
the sole and exclusive control of a federal agency.' 37 As such, Cali-
fornia had no jurisdiction over the DOE's activities or consequent
cleanup procedures. 38 The court reasoned the DTSC's claims of
authority to regulate the private radiological contamination lacked
130. See id. (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947))
(presenting test for preemption as to whether subject of state regulation is in any
way regulated by federal government).
131. See id. (explaining ways in which AEA preempts state law).
132. See id. (holding "SB 990 regulates squarely within the preempted field of
nuclear health and safety").
133. See id. at *9-10 (identifying language of SB 990 and DTSC's admitted
purpose of SB 990 as protection of environment, public health, and safety, as well
as mobilization of cleanup to fullest extent).
134. See Boeing, 2011 WL 1748312, at *10-11 (discussing whether AEA cedes
authority to state to regulate nuclear safety). A 1959 amendment to the AEA al-
lowed the AEA-created AEC to enter into agreements with states for the purpose of
providing them with authority to regulate nuclear safety with respect to certain
nuclear materials. Id. at *10.
135. Id. at *11 (quoting cessation of authority to California in 1962 Agree-
ment pursuant to AEA).
136. See id. (declaring 1962 agreement with California under AEA did not
relinquish federal control over DOE research, cleanup of resulting contamination,
or activities of DOE's prime contractors such as Boeing).
137. See id. (reasoning authority over DOE activities could not be and was not
ceded to California in 1962 agreements).
138. See id. (holding only DOE has power to implement cleanup and other
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validity because the DTSC admitted the vast majority of the contam-
ination stemmed from federal activity and any private contamina-
tion was indistinguishable from federal contamination.1 3 9
According to the court, the AOCs among the DTSC, the DOE,
and NASA did not validate SB 990 for three reasons.140 First, Boe-
ing was not a party to the AOCs; second, the AOCs' requirements
did not match those of SB 990; and third, the AOCs did not hold
the force of law.141 Because federal law preempts state law in the
field of nuclear safety, the AOCs were nonbinding, unless effectu-
ated by congressional legislation.142 Thus, the district court ruled
Congress invalidated SB 990 by explicitly occupying the field of nu-
clear safety and materials, and ceded no authority to California
under the AEA to regulate the same field.143
B. SB 990's Invalidity Under Intergovernmental Immunity
Doctrine
The United States District Court, Central District of California
further invalidated SB 990 because it directly regulated and discrim-
inated against a federal contractor in violation of the intergovern-
mental immunity doctrine.'44 The intergovernmental immunity
doctrine dictates a state cannot directly regulate the federal govern-
ment's operations or property without "clear and unambiguous"
congressional authorization.14 5 This doctrine also applies to fed-
eral private contractors, such as Boeing.146 Furthermore, the doc-
trine includes a proscription on state laws that discriminate,
139. See Boeing, 2011 WL 1748312, at *3, *15 (noting state's admission that
federal and private contamination were inextricably mixed).
140. See id. at *12 (eliminating AOCs as possibly giving California authority to
pass SB 990). The court examined the AOCs for any cessation of authority to
California by the federal agencies to conduct cleanup of SSFL, but found none.
Id. For a discussion of the reasons why the Consent Orders failed to authorize
California to pass SB 990, see infra notes 141-143 and accompanying text.
141. See Boeing, 2011 WL 1748312, at *12 (stating only act of Congress can
allow states to regulate nuclear materials).
142. See id. (finding need for congressional allowance for state regulation of
nuclear safety). " [N]othing other than an act of Congress can open this field to
regulation by the [s]tate". Id.
143. See id. at *15 (invalidating SB 990 for regulating in federally occupied
field).
144. See id. at *12 (discussing various prohibitions on state laws under inter-
governmental immunity doctrine).
145. See id. at *13 (describing "clear and unambiguous" standard for authori-
zation of direct state regulation of federal activity).
146. See Boeing, 2011 WL 1748312, at *12 (extending limitations on state regu-
lation to activities of federal contractors).
16
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol23/iss2/4
THE CALIFORNIA PROJECT
however slightly, against the federal government or its
contractors.' 47
According to the court, the California legislature attempted to
directly regulate the DOE, NASA, and Boeing in several ways.148
First, SB 990 mandated a particular cleanup procedure for SSFL
and imposed strict standards without determining the reasonable
future use of the land.'4 9 Second, the law expressly prohibited the
DOE, NASA, and Boeing from transferring or selling any part of
the land at the site until the parties completed the cleanup.1so
Third, it discriminated against the DOE, NASA, and Boeing by pre-
scribing strict standards for the cleanup procedure that only ap-
plied to SSFL and those parties.151
Additionally, the court reasoned that Congress had not clearly
and unambiguously authorized SB 990 or any other similar legisla-
tion.152 The court subsequently rejected the argument that the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Lia-
bility Act (CERCLA) and the RCRA granted any authority to Cali-
fornia or the DTSC to regulate the cleanup efforts at SSFL, which
would override the AEA's limitations on state authority.153 Thus,
the court concluded SB 990 failed in its entirety under the
Supremacy Clause because it regulated and discriminated against
the DOE and NASA's activities as federal agencies and Boeing as a
federal contractor.154
V. CITICAL ANALYSIS
When deciding Boeing, the United States District Court, Cen-
tral District of California followed a decades-old formula for pre-
147. See id. (adding state laws cannot discriminatorily regulate federal
activity).
148. See id. at *13 (discussing how SB 990 attempts to compel cleanup efforts
on part of DOE, NASA, and Boeing).
149. See id. (noting SB 990's lack of typical and realistic land-use analysis).
150. See id. (treating restrictions on transfer of SSFL land as discriminatory).
151. See Boeing, 2011 WL 1748312, at *13 (emphasizing SB 990 incorporates
stricter standards than usually required to make nuclear site suitable for suburban-
residential use).
152. See id. at *14 (noticing exception to doctrine of intergovernmental im-
munity if Congress provides clear and unambiguous authorization for state regula-
tion, but not finding such exception fulfilled here).
153. See id. (eliminating AEA or any other federal law as providing authority
to California to regulate cleanup at SSFL).
154. See id. at *15 (invalidating SB 990). "Because SB 990 unconstitutionally
regulates a federally occupied field and violates the doctrine of intergovernmental
immunity, the law fails in its entirety .... [A]ny attempt to implement SB 990 will
be barred by the Supremacy Clause." Id.
2932012]
17
Yanishevskiy: The California Project: Federal Government Continues Trend of Pre
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012
294 VILLANovA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII: p. 277
empting state action in the field of nuclear safety.'5 5 Namely, it
affirmed the previously established division of authority between
federal and state governments regulating nuclear power.15 6 Al-
though the court's analysis did not encompass all characteristics of
a particular case or all of the general tests for evaluating the validity
of state nuclear safety laws, the court would have arrived at the same
conclusion if it had included any additional examinations. 5 7
A. Following the Trend of Preemption and Invalidating State
Laws
In Boeing, the district court reaffirmed the roles of the state and
the federal governments, as described in the seminal case of Pacific
Gas, on the issue of preemption.158 A California statute withstood
the preemption analysis in Pacific Gas because the statute regulated
the economics of constructing a nuclear power plant rather than
nuclear safety.' 59 Consistent with the Pacific Gas precedent, the
court in Boeing invalidated SB 990 because the AEA preempted the
statute's expressed purpose of regulating nuclear safety.16 0
The court's preemption analysis also adhered to other circuit
court decisions on various aspects of the AEA's preemption of state
regulation in the nuclear energy field.16' First, the court did not
dwell on the characteristics of the waste at SSFL, but doing so would
155. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text for a discussion of the history
of the preemption doctrine and its role in nuclear technology regulation.
156. See generally Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (presenting seminal case on interpretation of pre-
emption under AEA).
157. See Boeing, 2011 WL 1748312, at *15-16 (eliminating potential legal bases
for SB 990). The court's analysis, though primarily focused on the preemption
doctrine, notes the mixed contamination at SSFL, but dismisses it and several
other factors as validating SB 990. Id.
158. See id. at *9-10 (holding SB 990 preempted for attempting to regulate
nuclear health and safety); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 205 (describing
different areas of regulation for which federal government and states are responsi-
ble under AEA).
159. Compare Boeing, 2011 WL 1748312, at *9 (stating purpose of SB 990 was
to "protect ... health and safety and the environment"), with Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.,
461 U.S. at 213-16 (finding state law not preempted if it has valid economic, non-
safety purpose).
160. See Boeing, 2011 WL 1748312, at *10 (noting DTSC's admission of protec-
tive purpose of SB 990); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 213-16 (finding
economic purpose for state law that concerned costs, rather than safety, of nuclear
waste disposal).
161. See Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 181 (1988) (holding
private contractor operating federal facility shielded from state regulation). See
generally United States v. Kentucky, 252 F.3d 816, 823 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding
federal law preempted state-mandated permit conditions).
18
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not have undermined the preemption analysis.16 2 The court noted
that pursuant to RCRA, California's DTSC had the authority to reg-
ulate non-radiological, chemical waste.163  RCRA prohibits the
"treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous waste . . . without a
permit issued by either the . . . [EPA] or an authorized state
agency." 64 RCRA specifically subjects itself to the AEA, however,
and acknowledges that its provisions do not apply to any activity or
substance covered by the AEA, specifically radioactive or nuclear
waste.165
In Boeing, the court followed the Sixth Circuit's conclusion in
Kentucky that RCRA expressly excludes "source, special nuclear, and
byproduct material," which the AEA exclusively regulates, from the
definition of solid waste.166 While RCRA permitted California to
direct the chemical cleanup at SSFL, the state instead attempted to
regulate the radiological cleanup of nuclear materials with SB 990,
which was exclusively covered by the AEA.1 67 Using similar reason-
ing, the court also rejected CERCLA or any other act of Congress as
granting such authority.168 A clear and unambiguous congressional
authorization must exist for a state to regulate federal activity.' 6 9
Second, the court in Boeing barely discussed whether the con-
tamination at SSFL consisted of a mixture of both radiological and
non-radiological waste.170 It likely assumed the waste was mixed
due to the diversity of research conducted and the contaminants
produced at SSFL; nonetheless, the reasoning in Kentucky would
162. See Boeing, 2011 WL 1748312, at *5 (emphasizing SB 990 focused on
cleanup of only radiological and chemical contamination at SSFL).
163. See id. at *8 (discussing RCRA provisions and role created for states).
164. See 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (1996) (describing general provisions of RCRA).
RCRA thus allows states to control the handling of hazardous waste, defined by
RCRA as solid waste. Id.
165. See Kentucky, 252 F.3d at 821-25 (evaluating limitations of RCRA
provisions).
166. See id. at 821-22 (interpreting meaning of solid waste under RCRA).
167. See Boeing, 2011 WL 1748312, at *9-10, *14 (eliminating RCRA as giving
California authority to regulate federal activity with respect to nuclear safety and
cleanup of nuclear sites).
168. See id. at *14 (disregarding CERCLA as providing California with author-
ity to regulate radiological decontamination of SSFL).
169. See id. (recognizing exception to intergovernmental immunity doctrine
when clear and unambiguous conressional approval exists).
170. See id. at *16 (noting SB 990 sought to combine risks from chemical and
radiological contamination at SSFL in mandating cleanup efforts). The court
notes, however, that both federal and private action contaminated SSFL. Id.
Therefore, "[b]ecause the Supremacy Clause bars the application of SB 990 to the
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still lead to the preemption of SB 990.171 According to the court in
Kentucky, states authorized to conduct cleanups under RCRA can
only regulate the cleanup of hazardous solid wastes at a site; the
DOE, as a federal agency, has the exclusive authority to regulate the
radiological cleanup under the AEA, regardless of whether the ra-
diological contamination was separate or part of a waste mixture.172
Due to the factual similarity with Kentucky, the court in Boeing would
likely have reached the same conclusion and maintained the divi-
sion of authority between the state and federal governments over
the different types of contaminants at SSFL.17 3 Interestingly, the
court used a similar analysis in Boeing regarding the difference be-
tween private and federal waste at SSFL, echoing the mixture exam-
ination presented above. 174 In contrast to the Kentucky decision,
the majority's discussion in Boeing focused on who was regulating
instead of what was regulated; nevertheless, the court still reached a
similar result.175
Third, the district court bolstered its decision in Boeing by af-
firming states cannot directly regulate the federal government's pri-
vate contractors, in the same way states cannot regulate federal
activities, because such action violates the intergovernmental immu-
nity doctrine.176 The Supreme Court articulated a similar holding
in Goodyear Atomic Corp.. 77 The majority in Goodyear Atomic Corp.
concluded a federal facility "performing a federal function is
shielded from direct state regulation, even though the federal func-
tion is carried out by a private contractor."17 8
171. See United States v. Kentucky, 252 F.3d 816, 822-24 (6th Cir. 2001) (up-
holding division of authority between state and federal governments even when
waste is mixed).
172. See id. at 823 (reasoning "DOE has exclusive authority to regulate the
radiological component of waste mixtures" while states authorized under RCRA
have authority to regulate hazardous portions).
173. Compare id. (preempting state permit conditions under AEA), with Boe-
ing, 2011 WL 1748312, at *10 (invalidating state contamination cleanup standards
on federal agencies).
174. See Boeing, 2011 WL 1748312, at *15 (describing impossibility of distin-
guishing private and federal waste at SSFL because they were inextricably
intermixed).
175. See id. at *15-16 (delineating impossibility of separating private waste
from federal waste at SSFL for regulation purposes).
176. See id. at *12-14 (describing intergovernmental immunity doctrine's pro-
hibition on direct state regulation of federal activity).
177. See generally Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 181 (1988)
(holding state regulation of activities of federal government's private contractor
invalid).
178. See id. at 181 (establishing state cannot directly regulate federal private
contractor).
20
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In Boeing, the DOE hired Boeing as a private contractor to con-
duct research at SSFL.179 Essentially, SB 990 purported to regulate
a federal activity, despite the fact that a federal agency's private con-
tractor performed the activity instead of the agency itself.180 Thus,
SB 990's attempt to regulate Boeing's activities fell directly under
the guillotine of the intergovernmental immunity doctrine, consis-
tent with the reasoning presented in Goodyear Atomic Corp. .181
B. Additional Unexamined Factors and Unused Tests
The court's decision in Boeing followed many previous appel-
late decisions on the matter of preemption.182 The court did not,
however, undertake additional examinations as articulated in prior
decisions.183 Nonetheless, the court likely would not have upheld
SB 990 if it had analyzed the following issues. 18 4
First, the court failed to note that neither the federal govern-
ment nor its private contractor, Boeing, still operated SSFL or that
it was a decommissioned nuclear testing facility.185 In Westinghouse
Electric, Westinghouse, L.L.C. argued the AEA only preempted state
regulation of nuclear safety at operating facilities.186 The Califor-
nia DTSC did not raise this argument in Boeing, so the court did not
address it.187 Regardless, such an argument would not have suc-
ceeded because, as Westinghouse Electric notes, there is "no distinc-
tion between the NRC's exclusive jurisdiction over nuclear safety at
179. See Boeing, 2011 WL 1748312, at *2 (outlining Boeing's role in nuclear
research and rocket testing at SSFL).
180. See id. at *12 (extending prohibition on state regulation of federal activ-
ity to private federal contractors).
181. See id. at *12-14 (discussing SB 990's discriminating effect on Boeing).
The court proceeded to invalidate SB 990 for regulating the activities of a federal
contractor at a federal facility in violation of the Supremacy Clause. Id. at *13.
182. See supra notes 158-181 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
court's Boeing decision in comparison with other courts' analyses of the preemp-
tion doctrine.
183. See Washington State Bldg. & Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO v.
Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1982) (presenting Commerce Clause
analysis of state laws in field of nuclear safety). See generally Missouri v. Westing-
house Elec., L.L.C., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1076 (E.D. Mo. 2007) (discussing decommis-
sioned facilities).
184. See infra notes 186-208 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
additional examinations the court did not undertake in Boeing.
185. See generally Boeing, 2011 WL 1748312 (failing to discuss status of SSFL).
186. See Westinghouse Elec., 487 F. Supp. 2d at 1086 (noting assertion that
NRC's exclusive jurisdiction may only apply to currently operating facilities).
187. See generally Boeing, 2011 WL 1748312 (failing to distinguish application
of preemption doctrine between commissioned and decommissioned facilities).
2972012]
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a[n] operating facility versus its jurisdiction at a decommissioned
one."1 88
Second, the court in Boeing did not examine SB 990's constitu-
tionality under the Commerce Clause.189 Instead, the court skip-
ped straight to a preemption and intergovernmental immunity
analysis.190 In Spellman, the Ninth Circuit utilized the following test
for a Commerce Clause violation, which asks whether the state law:
"(1) regulates evenhandedly; (2) accomplishes a legitimate local
public purpose; and (3) has only an incidental effect on interstate
commerce." 19'
Applying the Spellman test to the current case would illustrate
that SB 990 limits its more stringent decontamination standards to
SSFL, and thus does not regulate evenhandedly.19 2 While SB 990
arguably served a legitimate local public purpose by regulating nu-
clear decontamination to ensure public safety, it would fail under
the third prong of the test because it expressly criminalized the sale
of any parcel of SSFL land before the site met the standards of SB
990.193 Even if SSFL land would not participate in an interstate
commercial transaction, SB 990 would still affect interstate com-
merce if the land was used for agriculture as the California legisla-
ture envisioned in Boeing.194
Certainly, the Commerce Clause argument is more difficult to
establish, necessitating a three-pronged analysis of the state law and
its relationship to interstate commerce.195 Accordingly, Boeing re-
lied on the well-established preemption precedent rooted in the
188. See Westinghouse Elec., 487 F. Supp. 2d at 1086 (applying same preemption
standard for decommissioned facility as for facility in operation).
189. See generally Boeing, 2011 WL 1748312 (foregoing Commerce Clause ex-
amination for preemption analysis).
190. See id. at *15-16 (holding SB 990 violates Supremacy Clause under pre-
emption and intergovernmental immunity doctrines by regulating against federal
activity and federal contractor).
191. See Washington State Bldg. & Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO v.
Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 631 (9th Cir. 1982) (presenting test for Commerce Clause
violation). A state law would arguably not violate the Commerce Clause if it passed
the expressed test. Id.
192. See Boeing, 2011 WL 1748312, at *5 (acknowledging SB 990 applies only
to SSFL).
193. See id. at *6 (describing SB 990's prohibition on sale, lease, or other
transfer of SSFL land).
194. See id. at *5 (explaining SB 990's purpose to remediate SSFL sufficiently
enough for agricultural use).
195. See supra notes 189-194 and accompanying text for an elaboration on
the Commerce Clause test.
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Supremacy Clause by using the AEA. 196 The Commerce Clause
would have arguably invalidated SB 990 through an application of
the above test, but courts utilize the Commerce Clause analysis less
frequently in cases regarding nuclear technology regulation, in-
stead preferring to rely on the well-established preemption
doctrine.197
Third, the Boeing court failed to acknowledge the direct and
substantial test articulated in Manning.198 The Ninth Circuit incor-
porated an alternative test for preemption of state laws in Manning,
which arose when a state law did not directly regulate nuclear
safety.199 According to the Ninth Circuit, a federal law can preempt
a state law even if the state law did not regulate nuclear safety di-
rectly; in particular, a federal law could invalidate a state law that
has a direct and substantial impact on the decisions of the federal
government or its agencies regarding the field of nuclear safety.200
In Manning, the direct and substantial test determined the
AEA preempted a state law that effectively closed a nuclear facility
by preventing the DOE from storing waste at the facility until the
site was decontaminated.201 The direct and substantial test argua-
bly did not apply in Boeing because SB 990 expressly aimed to regu-
late nuclear safety at the SSFL facility, which automatically
invalidated the statute as regulating a federally-occupied field in vi-
olation of the Supremacy Clause.202 Nevertheless, if the Boeing
court had applied the direct and substantial test to SB 990's
196. See Boeing, 2011 WL 1748312, at *7-15 (analyzing validity of SB 990 under
Supremacy Clause).
197. For a discussion of various courts' analyses of the preemption doctrine,
see supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
198. See United States v. Manning, 527 F.3d 828, 839 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding
state law was preempted by AEA because it had direct and substantial impact on
radiological safety decisions).
199. See id. at 839 (invalidating state law under direct and substantial test
when it did not directly regulate nuclear safety); see also English v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
496 U.S. 72, 85 (1990) (utilizing direct and substantial test to analyze North Caro-
lina law).
200. See Manning, 527 F.3d at 840 (reasoning AEA can preempt state law even
when state law does not have nuclear safety purpose). The Ninth Circuit held the
AEA preempted a state law for "directly and substantially impactling] the DOE's
decisions on the nationwide management of nuclear waste". Id.
201. See id. at 831 (describing purposes of state law).
202. See Boeing Co. v. Robinson, No. CV 10-4839-JFW, 2011 WL 1748312, at
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cleanup standards and land transfer prohibition, it would have ar-
rived at a conclusion of preemption. 203
The stringent standards of SB 990 mandating a higher land-use
standard could influence the choices involved in decontaminating
SSFL if the DOE, NASA, and Boeing were forced to abide by the
law. 2 0 4 Specifically, the higher standards of SB 990 could have a
direct and substantial impact on the parties' decisions decontami-
nating the site.205 Though the court did not apply the direct and
substantial test to SB 990, its existence could impact future deci-
sions.206 While the California legislature must refrain from passing
nuclear technology safety laws, it can still legislate to affect nuclear
safety in some way, thereby creating an instance in which courts
could possibly use this test.2 07 The district court's decision to pre-
empt California's SB 990 regulation not only complied with other
court decisions on the issue of state law preemption under the
Supremacy Clause, but none of the unexamined aspects or alterna-
tive tests would have validated SB 990.208
VI. IMPACT
Contemporary public sentiment toward nuclear technology no
longer envisions a bright future powered by nuclear energy.209 Af-
ter various nuclear site accidents and near misses, the skeptical pub-
lic increasingly opposes nuclear proliferation, and safety concerns
now overrule the possibility of nuclear energy as a viable alternative
energy source. 210 Simultaneously, the federal government loathes
abandoning its exclusive control over nuclear safety, so Boeing is no
revolutionary decision in this regard.211
203. See id. at *5-6 (describing SB 990's land use assumption provision and
prohibition on sale or transfer of SSFL land until land is fully remediated).
204. See id. (discussing SB 990's stringent requirements to make SSFL safe for
subsistence farming).
205. See id. at *5 (contrasting DOE's approval of possible land-use with SB
990's infeasible requirements).
206. See id. at *5, *10 (failing to apply direct and substantial test and noting
express purpose of SB 990).
207. See United States v. Manning, 527 F.3d 828, 839 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding
state law can be preempted for having direct and substantial impacts on decisions
regarding nuclear waste).
208. For an examination of previous decisions on preemption, see supra notes
88-120 and accompanying text.
209. See Maleson, supra note 1, at 632 (discussing disillusionment with nuclear
technology in modem era).
210. See id. (emphasizing change in public opinion toward nuclear power).
211. See supra notes 158-207 and accompanying text for a comparison of Boe-
ing with other decisions on the issue of preemption.
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In fact, Boeing demonstrates how slow the institutional re-
sponse, on the judicial, executive, and legislative fronts, can be to a
growing social concern. 212 Even in an era disfavoring nuclear tech-
nology because of its associated risks, courts have responded to
states' anxiety and apprehension by maintaining the status quo. 2 13
At the same time, states may face immediate dangers from nuclear
radiation, contamination, or even explosion.214 Because the AEA
preempts state action to ensure nuclear safety, states must wait for
the federal government to mobilize cleanup procedures of nuclear
sites; Boeing stands as a testament to how ineffective and sluggish
those federal efforts can be.21 5 Yet, as Boeing illustrates, the current
regulatory regime may endure.216
Additionally, Boeing and the ancestry of cases on the issue of
nuclear safety preemption obscure the real crisis. 217 While states
squabble with federal agencies over which has the authority to insti-
gate cleanup efforts at nuclear sites or regulate the storage of vola-
tile radioactive materials, the actual initiation of those efforts and
regulations remains unfulfilled.218 Thus, sites such as SSFL may
stand idle for decades, increasingly endangering local citizens,
while states and federal agencies decide who should clean up the
mess.219 In its mechanical application of the preemption analysis,
the district court in Boeing failed to recognize the importance of
nuclear waste disposal and decontamination, despite the need to
secure nuclear safety for the public. 220
As the need for alternative energy sources grows, more nuclear
power reactors are developed and put into operation, and public
212. See Maleson, supra note 1, at 604 (discussing typical delay in institutional
response to technological change).
213. See id. (noting judicial conservativeness).
214. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Robinson, No. CV 10-4839-JFW, 2011 WL 1748312,
at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2011) (describing contamination at SSFL in California).
215. See supra notes 3744, 53-54 and accompanying text for a description of
the federal effort to decontaminate SSFL.
216. See Boeing, 2011 WL 1748312, at *15-16 (holding state law regulating nu-
clear decontamination and safety preempted by AEA).
217. For a discussion of significant decisions regarding the relationship be-
tween nuclear technology and preemption, see supra notes 88-120 and accompany-
ing text.
218. See Boeing, 2011 WL 1748312, at *5 (sympathizing with California's "un-
derstandable frustration" with lack of cleanup efforts).
219. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text for a recounting of Califor-
nia's frustration with the lack of federal cleanup efforts.
220. See Boeing, 2011 WL 1748312, at *10 (invalidating SB 990 for regulating
in federally occupied field).
2012] 301
25
Yanishevskiy: The California Project: Federal Government Continues Trend of Pre
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012
302 VILIANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW jouRNAL [Vol. XXIII: p. 277
concern over their safety has grudgingly abated.22 1 The world
strives for cleaner, more efficient energy sources, and nuclear
power may once again become a viable option despite its immense
dangers. 222 Yet, what novel environmental issues will arise with re-
newed nuclear proliferation and the environmental impact they
might have are still unknown.223 Therefore, the scheme of nuclear
technology regulation may look very different in the future as roles
for the federal government and the states potentially change in
drastic ways. 2 2 4 Boeing still maintains a decades-old philosophy that
may no longer apply as strongly in today's world.2 2 5 Whether future
decisions will upend the status quo upheld in Boeing remains to be
seen.226
Denis Yanishevskiy*
221. See Repka & Smith, supra note 9, at 31 (stating more nuclear develop-
ment is coming in near future).
222. See id., (arguing after twenty-five years, there will be increased focus on
nuclear power technology).
223. See id., at 31-33 (discussing future issues in regulating nuclear
technology).
224. See id., at 32 (prophesizing continuation of debate on disposal of nuclear
waste).
225. See supra notes 158-181 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
consistency of Boeing with previous decisions on preemption.
226. See Boeing Co. v. Robinson, No. CV 10-4839-JFW, 2011 WL 1748312, at
*15-16 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2011) (summarizing court's preemption analysis).
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Villanova University, School of Law; B.A., 2010,
Bucknell University.
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